European Strategic Autonomy — An Alarming End To The US-Europe Marriage?
Europe’s dreams of autonomy are, at best, long term prospects, but is the policy viable in any way?
The cold air in Brussels is cautious but hopeful. Since 2016, Europe has steadily drifted — at least rhetorically — away from relying on the United States for security. It has emphasized the need for European Strategic Autonomy. What is the wider historical context of this notion? and is it a feasible path for the European Union?
Following the devastation of the Second World War, the United States launched the European Recovery Program — better known as the Marshall Plan — which forever changed transatlantic relations.
To match the rising communist influence in Eastern Europe, the plan rushed to inject millions of dollars into the post-war economies of Western European nations, provided they aligned themselves with the United States in this newly formed world order. This, along with the security guarantees provided by NATO after 1949, linked both sides of the pond in what seemed like an inseparable connection. Or so it seemed…
Today, the French deem NATO so obsolete as to call it “brain-dead”, Brussels declares its determination to build “European Strategic Autonomy,” and the Americans themselves have shifted their focus far from the European continent, to the Sleeping Giant in the Far East.
Now, when all rules seem to be collapsing, it is time to look at European integration, the European Union as a potential superpower, and study their ability to supplant American hegemony, and break the Atlantic marriage.
European Soft Power
First, it is essential to define the weapons at Europe’s disposal. Recently, Europe has been an exemplary champion of Soft Power.
Although definitions vary today, Joseph Nye originally defined Soft Power as the capacity to influence other nations through the use of persuasion and attraction rather than coercion or force. Soft power relies on culture, arts, and science, while Hard Power relies on military, economics, and finance.
One aspect I find particularly significant in projecting global power is cultural imperialism. As the birthplace of colonialism and then imperialism, it is perhaps surprising that Europe was able to dramatically alter its image into an inclusive continent of welfare states. Yet Europe’s ability to redress itself was largely thanks to its mastery of cultural power.
Today, Europe invests in developing nations, hosts leading universities, offers affordable education, and regulates technology like no other entity on Earth. European languages are the most spoken in the world, and thanks to Europe’s Soft diplomacy, its seemingly apolitical charity in developing nations serves to polish Europe’s image as an impartial and eminent embodiment of justice and freedom.
Europe did not adopt this new policy willingly; rather, it was born out of the dying gasp of its former colonial self.
When its colonial dominance faded, Europe resorted to its cultural and economic significance to project its status into the world. An early microcosm of this soon-to-be continental policy is France and its cold war policy of grandeur. France is quite special in the way it handled the idea of hard power and soft power during that time; or rather de Gaulle was. When he assumed the presidency in 1958, France had lost its possessions in the Levant, Southeast Asia, and others, while desperately fighting to retain control of Algeria. Despite the overwhelming indicators of fading French power, de Gaulle insisted on a rhetoric of France being a force apart: acting unilaterally, withdrawing from NATO’s integrated command, sermonizing the Americans on Vietnam, and overall being the West’s enfant terrible.
Although many criticize his foreign policy as denying the realities of the time, pretending to French power when it clearly did not exist, I tend to admire de Gaulle’s efforts to veer France — and Europe at large — towards autonomy in a bipolar world order. The true effects of his policies may have not been ideal on the ground, but they sowed the seeds European Autonomy and positioned the European nations as the arbitrators but not participants in the fight of the great powers.
Later, the United Kingdom will try for the Commonwealth of Nations as a way to retain some global influence, France will resort to the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie. Both attempts at using culture and language as a form of soft power saw varying degrees of success depending on the criteria for it. Neither the Commonwealth nor the OIF succeeded in retaining their initiators colonial glory, but they did leave a somewhat mystical reminder of former European grandeur.
De Gaulle and his successors failed in establishing his French dream due to a myriad of reasons, many of which will similarly prevent 21st century Europe from exerting itself politically and economically in the world.
Contemporary Carthage
Having noted Europe’s unique ability to exert soft power through culture, trade, and regulation, it is time to strike at Europe’s Achilles’ heel: hard power. Europe lacks sorely in terms of hard power, and the Europeans know that well. They have depended on NATO for over half a century for their defense and security and now they are faced with a challenge. With NATO losing its focus and significance, is Strategic Autonomy a viable alternative?
In the 2nd century B.C., Carthage lead a powerful trade empire on the southern coast of the Mediterranean after being established by Phoenician settlers from the now-Lebanese city of Tyre. Carthage prospered with little competition to its regional supremacy until the Roman Republic began threatening its position. Three long wars followed and ended in the complete destruction of Carthage as a political, economic, and cultural entity.
Notably, the three Punic wars were marked by one thing in particular: Carthaginian military incompetence. Carthage’s security at the time, relied on expensive mercenaries who usually fell under inexperienced Carthaginian command. If you are unfamiliar with basic military strategy… Mercenaries are more often than not treacherous liabilities rather than loyal soldiers. Carthage’s weakness was not even resources, they had plenty of gold to spare, and their military was much better equipped than the underfunded roman military. The Carthaginians could afford to build ships, buy war elephants, and invest in the most infamous mercenaries of the Mediterranean. And despite all these apparent advantages, Rome still managed to destroy Carthage and salt its ruins so it would never see the light of day again.
Even its vast riches and reaching trade empire could not save Carthage from Rome’s decisive military supremacy.
The distressing similarities between Carthage over two thousand years ago and Europe today are very rarely talked about. Still, though they may offer unique insight, historical parallels are not modern-day Europe’s primary doom prophet. That would be reality, staring right into Europe’s lacking manpower and lax defense spending.
Demographic Decline
Another reason for contemporary European weakness is its own shrinking population. Demographics is often overlooked by pundits and politicians, but it is essential to any geopolitical discussion. When studying potential superpowers and projecting the future dominance of nations, political scientists consider population growth as one of the main criteria.
Generally speaking, a high growth rate indicates great superpower potential, as it ensures sufficient manpower in all sectors ranging from agriculture to security. Some countries considered as potential superpowers thanks to their demographic prospects include Brazil and South Africa.
Shrinking or aging populations are typically associated with geopolitical decline. Although shrinking populations cripple the various sectors in need of cheap labor, they also provide a higher quality of skilled labor. This results in the outsourcing of cheap manufacturing jobs to demographic wells such as southeast Asia. Outsourcing is a smart workaround to keep the economy going in developed nations, yet, critically, security cannot be outsourced, unless the nation is willing to resort to the Carthaginian option: mercenaries.
Thus, though the problem’s severity varies across European nations, the continent as a whole is faced with a looming security crisis. Due to their limited population size, they cannot uphold armies capable of long-term low-intensity conflict. To circumvent their demographic crisis and military limitations, the Europeans resort to the protection of their friend across the pond: the United States of America.
The United States does not suffer nearly as much from demographic issues as European countries, and it is empowered by two decades of post-cold war economic and political supremacy over the world. Until…
The Sleeping Giant of Asia
Napoleon Bonaparte famously remarked: “China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep for when she wakes up she will move the world.” And indeed she did.
The focus of the United States in the past decade and especially under the Trump administration has shifted considerably towards the Far East where the sleeping giant of Asia stirs. Pundits in the United States tend to overstate the importance of US military superiority in a potential showdown with China. Although the United States’ hard power is indeed impressive, China has begun conducting its own policy abroad, mixing between soft and hard power in a rather unique brand of foreign policy.
Chinese foreign policy is primarily fueled by its economic might rather than by military intervention, though it is fully capable of using both. Smart investments in Africa and Latin America, links with prominent leaders of developing nations, and an overwhelming technological rebirth have all aided in China’s sudden return to relevance. It is quite impressive to see China craft its image so meticulously, and deftly wield it to project Soft Power.
Contrast this with the United States, who’s Hard Power is undeniable, but her ability to project her will through sheer diplomacy and statecraft has come into question. The US these days seems always forced to brandish its military might to coerce nations into following its orders. This is particularly fascinating, because military force usually generates a nation much prestige. Yet somehow, the United States has lost this in recent years, and has become a power with military force devoid of global credibility.
Finally, the European question. It is clear that Europe shines through its prestige, grandeur, and Soft Power, and it somehow maintains the grande veneer of an impartial judge-like arbitrator. However, by now, you must have determined that Europe’s critical weakness is its demographic composition, which forces it to maintain high-tech low-manpower militaries that rely heavily on NATO support.
Synthesis and Final Thoughts
The idea of European Strategic Autonomy is hardly new, it is born out of a desire to elevate Europe’s global status from America’s backyard to a “force apart;” especially, today, with the United States’ scrambling to retrieve its global credibility and prestige, Europhiles like Emmanuel Macron see this preoccupation as an opportunity to divorce both sides of the pond and establish European Autonomy.
Though this Autonomy might have become a declared goal of the European Commission, it faces difficult logistical and administrative issues in addition to the endless debate about the jurisdiction of the EU’s institutions. Simply, the plan cannot work within the current confines of the EU as the organization is not yet supranational enough to formulate unified meaningful foreign policy.
Furthermore, the two pillars of the EU, France and Germany, disagree on the nature of Strategic Autonomy and the extent to which it ought to render the Europeans independent from American security. It will be interesting to observe whether Europeans stick to their rhetoric should the United States re-establish its global image.
Regardless of all the above difficulties, Europe is already on the road of some form of strategic autonomy. Since 2006, the Common Security and Defense Policy has been central in how the EU manages its foreign affairs, and has pushed it towards a more autonomous stance.
Finally, I diverge widely with those that believe the EU can continue to safely rely on the United States for its security. Indeed, I think with US preoccupation with China, Europe is on its own to fend off against encroaching dangers.
It is difficult to see how European foreign policy unity could go beyond collective defense, but the recent developments in Eastern Europe demonstrate how well the Europeans can do when they stand together. With all that being said, they will be the first at the peacemaking table. I take that as European grandeur, another might take it as European cowardice.
Hey there! Thank you for reading through to the very end. I hope you enjoyed this very empirical and analytical article on Europe. Drawing on historical context is something I love doing, and I think it always adds valuable information to the topic under discussion. If you enjoyed this article, do consider clapping, sharing, and subscribing for more!
